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SCHIAVO AND KLEIN 
Evan Caminker* 
When teaching federal courts, I sometimes find that stu-
dents are slow to care about legal issues that initially seem pica-
yune, hyper-technical, and unrelated to real-world concerns. It 
takes hard work to engage students in discussion of United States 
v. Klein, 1 notwithstanding its apparent articulation of a founda-
tional separation of powers principle that Congress may not dic-
tate a "rule of decision" governing a case in federal court.2 A 
Civil War-era decision about the distribution of war spoils, one 
the Supreme Court has hardly ever cited since and then only to 
distinguish it, in cases involving takings and spotted owls? Yawn. 
I've tried in the past to grab students' attention by conjuring 
up far-fetched hypotheticals designed to make something unas-
sailably significant turn on whether a statute dictates a rule of 
decision in violation of Klein. I can now rest my imagination; 
Schiavo v. Schiavo presents the issue in a life-or-death scenario. 
And life-or-death describes not just the stakes for Terri 
Schiavo herself, but also for the traditional understanding of 
Klein. In this brief essay I explain why, if the federal statute in 
question doesn't violate Klein by impermissibly dictating to the 
federal courts a rule of decision, then Klein must be virtually im-
possible to violate. 
I 
I will not belabor here the background or resolution of the 
Schiavo litigation; they are well known and discussed in some 
detail in other contributions to this symposium. It is sufficient for 
my purposes to state the following. Terri Schiavo required a 
feeding tube after a medical incident left her in a permanent 
vegetative state.3 Her family disagreed as to whether this form of 
• Dean and Professor of Law, University of Michigan. 
1. 80 u.s. 128 (1871). 
2 /d. at 146. 
3. Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321,324 (Fla. 2004). 
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life support should be terminated, with ex-husband Michael 
Schiavo favoring termination and parents Robert and Mary 
Schindler favoring continuation.4 The issue was brought to the 
state courts of Florida and, in many proceedings spanning many 
years, a final state judgment emerged to authorize the with-
drawal of Terri's feeding tube.5 
But Congress had other ideas. After heated debate captur-
ing national attention, Congress decided that Terri's parents 
ought to have another opportunity to make their case-this time 
in federal court. Congress passed "An Act for the Relief of the 
Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo" (the "Schiavo Relief Act") 
designed to let the parents file a federal lawsuit to mandate con-
tinued tube feeding wholly unencumbered by their loss in the 
state court proceedings.6 Terri's parents did indeed file such a 
lawsuit, but the suit was unsuccessful. 7 Terri's feeding tube was 
ultimately removed, and she eventually passed away. 
For purposes of this litigation, federal courts generally as-
sumed the constitutionality of the Schiavo Relief Act. Judge 
Birch of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit, however, concurred in a denial of rehearing en bane on 
the ground that the Act violated the separation of powers.8 Per-
haps because of the frenetic pace of the litigation, Judge Birch's 
opinion did not emerge as a model of clarity. Citing Klein as well 
as other separation of powers cases, Judge Birch concluded that 
the Act "invades the province of the judiciary"9 because it "at-
tempt[s] to 'direct[] what particular steps shall be taken in the 
progress of a judicial inquiry."'10 Judge Birch's Rrecise reasoning 
leading to this conclusion is not entirely clear. But in my view 
4. /d. at 325. 
5. ld. at 325-28; Schiavo ex reL Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225-26 (11th 
Cir. 2005). 
6. Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005). 
7. Schiavo ex reL Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223 (11th ar. 2005), application 
for stay of enforcement denied, 544 U.S. 945 (2005); Schiavo ex reL Schindler v. Schiavo, 
404 F.3d 1270 (11th ar. 2005), application for stay of enforcement denied, 544 U.S. 957 
(2005). 
8. Schiavo ex reL Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1271 (11th ar. 2005). 
9. Id. at 1274. 
10. /d. (quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift farm. Inc., 514 U.S. 211,225 (1995)). 
11. Judge Birch cites Klein along with a host of other separation of powers cases, 
but he never clearly pegs the Act's constitutional defect specifically to Klein, nor does he 
convincingly demonstrate what the Klein problem would be. At one point he suggests 
that the Act's problem is that it purports to regulate a set of legal principles, including 
the standard of review and other doctrines traditionally calling for judicial judgment. See 
Schiavo, 404 F.3d at 1274 ("By setting a particular standard of review in the district court, 
Section 2 of the Act purports to direct a federal court in an area traditionally left to the 
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he is on to something that can, in fact, be spelled out in quite 
simple and straightforward terms. 
II 
In Klein, the Supreme Court invalidated a congressional 
statute for transgressing the boundary between legislative and 
judicial powerY The plaintiff in Klein, the executor of the estate 
of a Confederate supporter, sought to recover the value of the 
decedent's cotton, which was seized by treasury agents of the 
United States during the Civil War.13 The executor brought suit 
under the Abandoned and Captured Property Act, which au-
thorized noncombatant confederate landowners to recover 
seized property upon proof of loyalty to the federal govem-
ment.14 While in fact the landowner had been disloyal, he had 
previously received a Presidential pardon by taking an oath to 
support the Constitution and the union of the states. In United 
States v. Padelford, the Supreme Court had held that a Presiden-
tial pardon would suffice as proof of "loyalty" for purposes of 
the seizure statute.15 Based on the pardon, the court of claims in 
the Klein proceedings awarded the landowner recovery.16 But 
pending the government's appeal from that decision, Congress 
passed an appropriations proviso declaring that pardons were 
inadmissible as proof of loyalty to the federal government and 
that acceptance of a pardon, under most circumstances, was con-
clusive evidence of disloyalty requiring dismissal of the suit. 17 
The proviso further directed the Supreme Court to dismiss any 
case in which a claimant had prevailed in the court of claims if 
federal court to decide .... By denying federal courts the ability to exercise abstention or 
inquire as to exhaustion or waiver under State law, the Act robs federal courts of judicial 
doctrines long-established for the conduct of prudential decisionmaking."). This is the 
defect Judge Tjotlat believes Judge Birch has identified, as evidenced by the former's 
response. See id. at 1280 {Tjotlat, dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) {"I believe 
that it is fully within Congress's power to dictate standards of review and to waive in spe-
cific cases nonconstitutional abstention doctrines."). Later, Judge Birch suggests that the 
problem is more limited: "(I]t is the abrogation of such standards (of review] in a single 
case, not in a category of cases .... " Id. at 1275 n.4. Later still, Judge Birch finally fo-
cuses on the core concern of Klein, noting that in the Act "the federal judiciary is in-
structed as to how to conduct this specific case." /d. at 1275 n.5. 
12. 80 u.s. 128 (1871). 
13. ld. at 132. 
14. Ch. 120, 12 Stat. 820 {1863). 
15. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 543 (1870). 
16. Klein, 80 U.S. at 143. 
17. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 235. 
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the claimant prevailed upon proof of loyalty by Presidential par-
don.18 
In Klein, the Supreme Court recognized that the "great and 
controlling purpose [of the proviso] is to deny to pardons 
granted by the President the effect which this court had ad-
judged them to have [in Padelford]."19 As such, the proviso vio-
lated separation of powers principles on two independent 
grounds. First, the proviso "passed the limit which separates the 
legislative from the judicial power. "20 As the Court explained, 
the proviso dictated the outcome of federal adjudication "solely 
on the application of a rule of decision, in causes pending, pre-
scribed by Congress."21 This, the Court held, Congress could not 
do: 
It seems to us that this is not an exercise of the acknowledged 
power of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe regula-
tions to the appellate power. The court is required to ascer-
tain the existence of certain facts and thereupon to declare 
that its jurisdiction on appeal has ceased, by dismissing the 
bill. What is this but to prescribe a rule for the decision of a 
cause in a particular way? In the case before us, the Court of 
Claims has rendered judgment for the claimant and an appeal 
has been taken to this court. We are directed to dismiss the 
appeal, if we find that the judgment must be affirmed, be-
cause of a pardon granted to the intestate of the claimants. 
Can we do so without allowing one party to the controversy to 
decide it in its own favor? Can we do so without allowing that 
the legislature may prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial 
Department of the government in cases pending before it? 
We think not ... ?2 
To clarify its ruling the Court distinguished its previous de-
cision in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 23 in 
which the Court held that Congress could change the outcome of 
a dispute by enacting new legslation changing the substantive 
law applicable to that dispute. 4 The two differed in a critical as-
18. !d. 
19. Klein, 80 U.S. at 145. 
20. /d. at 147. 
21. /d. at 146. 
22 /d. at 146. 
23. 59 u.s. 421 (1855). 
24. The Court had originally held that a bridge was an obstruction. Subsequent leg-
islation, however, made the bridge a post-road for passage of the United States mail and 
required that navigation not interfere with the bridge. The Court concluded in Wheeling 
Bridge that this new statute changed the previous law and thereby dictated a different 
adjudicatory outcome: "(A]lthough [the bridge] still may be an obstruction in fact, (it] is 
2005] SCHIAVO AND KLEIN 533 
pect: "No arbitrary rule of decision was prescribed in [Wheeling 
Bridge], but the court was left to apply its ordinary rules to the 
new circumstances created by the act. In bKlein], no new circum-
stances ha[ d) been created by legislation." 5 
After concluding that the proviso governing the evidentiary 
significance of pardons infringed upon the judicial power, the 
Klein Court went on to determine that "[t]he rule prescribed is 
also liable to just exception as impairing the effect of a pardon6 and thus infringing the constitutional power of the Executive"2 
because it purported to affix the meaning of a presidential par-
don in a manner contrary to the intention of the issuing Presi-
dent. Some, perhaps unsure of the footing of the judicial power 
analysis, have suggested Klein is best understood as hinging on 
this executive power infringement claim.27 But the structure and 
language of the Court's opinion make clear that the two separa-
tion of powers principles discussed in Klein operate in the dis-
junctive: The proviso governing pardons was unconstitutional 
because it independently transgressed the judicial and "also" the 
executive power. 
Since Klein was decided, the Court and most federal courts 
scholars have taken its seemingly central language concerning 
the line between legislative and judicial power at face value: 
Congress may not "prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial 
Department of the government in cases pending before it. "28 
While Congress can of course add to or modify the substance of 
the law (within its limited constitutional authority) and thereby 
influence the outcome of litigation interpreting and applying that 
law, Congress may not leave the law unchanged but simply order 
the courts to decide a specific case under that preexisting law in 
a particular manner. 
not so in the contemplation of law." 59 U.S. at 430. 
25. Klein, 80 U.S. at 146-47. 
26. Id. at 147 (emphasis added). 
27. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE 
FEDERAL CoURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 369 n.22 (4th ed. 1996); Kent S. Schei-
degger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative Power, 98 CoLUM. L. REv. 888, 
922 (1998). 
28. ld. at 146; see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc, 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (de-
scribing Klein as a case in which "we refused to give effect to a statute that was said '[to] 
prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the government in cases pend-
ing before it"') (citation omitted); United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 
405 (1980) ("[T]he proviso at issue in Klein [was unconstitutional because it] had at-
tempted 'to prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way."') (citation 
omitted). 
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III 
The Schiavo Relief Act states very clearly that it does not 
add to or modify the substance of any federal law claims that 
Terri might have against any of the authorized defendants?9 Nor 
does the Act tell courts how to address or resolve any such sub-
stantive claims. At first glance, therefore, the Act does not seem 
to tell federal courts how any cases should be decided. 
But let's take a closer look at what the Act does do. Section 
I simply grants federal jurisdiction over the case.30 In fact, for 
these purposes Section I is redundant with the basic grant of ju-
risdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which already grants jurisdiction 
for claimed violations of federal constitutional or statutory law. 31 
In effect, then, Section I is essentially a redundant predicate to 
the real operative provisions of the Schiavo Relief Act, which 
follow in Section II entitled "Procedure." Section II states as fol-
lows: 
Any parent of Theresa Marie Schiavo shall have standing to 
bring a suit under this Act. The suit may be brought against 
any other person who was a party to State court proceedings 
relating to the withholding or withdrawal of food, fluids, or 
medical treatment necessary to sustain the life of Theresa 
Marie Schiavo, or who may act pursuant to a State court or-
der authorizing or directing the withholding or withdrawal of 
food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain her life. 
In such a suit, the District Court shall determine de novo any 
claim of a violation of any right of Theresa Marie Schiavo 
within the scope of this Act, notwithstanding any prior State 
court determination and regardless of whether such a claim 
has previously been raised, considered, or decided in State 
court proceedings. The District Court shall entertain and de-
termine the suit without any delay or abstention in favor of 
29. Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 5, 119 Stat. 15 (2005) ("No Change of Substantive Rights. 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to create substantive rights not otherwise secured 
by the Constitution and laws of the United States or of the several States."). 
30. See Section 1, 119 Stat. 15 ("Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo. 
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida shall have jurisdiction 
to hear, determine, and render judgment on a suit or claim by or on behalf of Theresa 
Marie Schiavo for the alleged violation of any right of Theresa Marie Schiavo under the 
Constitution or laws of the United States relating to the withholding or withdrawal of 
food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain her life."). 
31. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising un-
der the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The fact 
that Section I of the Schiavo Relief Act specifies that jurisdiction lies in the Middle Dis-
trict of Florida might possibly be read as trumping 28 U.S.C. § 1391 for Schiavo Relief 
Act suits, such that they may be brought only in this district notwithstanding the broader 
array of venues that would otherwise have been appropriate. 
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State court proceedings, and regardless of whether remedies 
available in the State courts have been exhausted. 
535 
What does all this mean? The point of Section II, simply put, is 
to clear away some procedural hurdles that almost certainly 
would otherwise trip up Schiavo's parents as they entered the 
federal courthouse. The first hurdle involves prudential (non-
Article III) limitations on standing in federal court. While this 
hurdle and the Act's override of it raise some interesting ques-
tions, they are not my primary focus here, and I will largely put 
them aside.32 
32. Typically, when a person possessing Article III standing attempts to assert the 
rights of another person in federal court (here, Terri's parents asserting Terri's rights), 
the federal court assesses the propriety of so-called "third-party standing" by engaging in 
a contextualized inquiry of both the rightholder's ability to assert her own rights and her 
relationship with her would-be representative. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 
(1976). Terri's parents might have faced difficulty qualifying for standing under existing 
prudential standing doctrine. Whether Terri could have litigated her own rights is a tricky 
question, as one might plausibly say she could do so-through her guardian for these 
purposes, ex-husband Michael; whether the parents had a sufficiently close relationship 
to Terri to represent her interests is also tricky, precisely because their view of her inter-
ests was directly at odds with her guardian's view of her interests. But the Supreme Court 
has held that Congress can authorize third-party standing in these circumstances by ex-
press provision. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997) ("Congress legislates 
against the background of our prudential standing doctrine, which applies unless it is ex-
pressly negated."), and the first sentence of Section II clearly does so here. 
There is a separate and I think interesting question of law lurking here: When Con-
gress provides an express grant of standing clearly designed to overcome prudential 
standing concerns (third-party concerns or otherwise), does such congressional provision 
mean that the prudential inquiry disappears and the federal court must entertain the 
claim (assuming Article III standing exists)? Or does it mean that, as a matter of Article 
III judicial power, the federal court still retains the discretion to decide on all-things-
considered prudential grounds whether the particular·piaintiff has standing, such that in 
theory the court could still say "while the congressional grant of standing has mitigated 
the concerns that counsel restraint, this court does not believe the concerns have been 
eliminated entirely, and therefore standing is still denied on prudential grounds"? Judge 
Tjoflat seems to embrace the former, mandatory view. See Schiavo, 404 F.3d at 1280 
(Tjoflat, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) (asserting Congress may "re-
quire" federal courts to grant standing despite prudential reasons for hesitation). And I 
know of no case denying standing on prudential grounds despite an express grant of 
standing, or even asserting that the court could still deny standing if it believed doing so 
would be appropriate under the circumstances. That said, this latter possibility might re-
flect the better understanding. Presumably the prudential standing inquiry is an exercise 
of judicial discretion over whether to exercise the jurisdiction afforded by the Constitu-
tion and federal statutes; it is not clear that Congress should be able to "order" the court 
how to exercise this discretion. Indeed, one might also distinguish between the two pri-
mary "prudential" reasons to deny standing. The "generalized grievance" prudential 
concern reflects a judicial desire to defer certain types of decisionmaking to the political 
branches. A congressional grant of standing intended to overcome this prudential con-
cern arguably functions as a congressional waiver of its institutional interest in resolving 
the matter through a political response. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997) 
("Congress' decision to grant a particular plaintiff the right to challenge an Act's consti-
tutionality ... eliminates any prudential standing limitations and significantly lessens the 
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The other hurdles all involve different doctrines that I will 
collectively refer to as "restraint doctrines" in that they are de-
signed to mandate or encourage federal court restraint in defer-
ence to state court decisionmaking. These doctrines include pre-
clusion, abstention, and exhaustion. Preclusion doctrine would 
normally bar federal court relitigation of cases and issues finally 
decided in state court;33 abstention doctrine could in theory have 
counseled federal court restraint in deference to ongoing state 
proceedings (a doctrine that could have been triggered if 
Schiavo's parents filed a new case concerning Terri's feeding and 
treatment in state court);34 and exhaustion doctrine could in the-
ory have precluded Schiavo's parents from bringing claims in 
federal court that had not yet been fully litigated in state court.35 
Now, federal courts scholars have long debated the source and 
risk of unwanted conflict with the Legislative Branch when that plaintiff brings suit."). 
The "third-party" prudential concern reflects a judicial desire to protect the interests of 
the real rightholder. Here one could imagine a court, even in the face of a congressional 
grant of standing intended to overcome the third-party prudential concern, concluding 
that it can assess the rightholder's interests better than can Congress and thus it ought 
not blindly to defer to Congress' judgment about the matter. 
33. With respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (the logical pre-Schiavo 
Relief Act source of a federal cause of action to relitigate the feeding tube issue), see, for 
example, Migra v. Warren City School District, 465 U.S. 75 (1984), which held that state 
court litigation has a claim preclusion effect in subsequent § 1983 litigation, and Allen v. 
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980}, which held that state court litigation has an issue preclusion 
effect in subsequent § 1983 litigation. It has also been assumed by many that the so-called 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine would have barred a federal court suit, which precludes district 
courts from exercising essentially "appellate" jurisdiction over "cases brought by state-
court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the 
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of 
those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indust. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 
(2005); see District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); 
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). But see Lance v. Dennis, 126 S. a. 
1198, 1201 (2006} ("[O]ur cases since Feldman have tended to emphasize the narrowness 
of the Rooker-Feldman rule."). 
34. One might imagine situations in which either the so-called Pullman abstention 
or Younger abstention doctrines might have influenced federal court proceedings. See 
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (extending Younger abstention principles 
in certain circumstances to state civil proceedings); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) 
(asserting that in certain circumstances federal courts should abstain pending conclusion 
of state criminal proceedings); Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 
(1941) (asserting that under certain circumstances federal courts should abstain from 
federal constitutional rulings where clarification of state law might make such rulings 
unnecessary). It strikes me as unlikely that these abstention doctrines would actually 
have been called into play in a federal suit over Terri's feeding tube, but Congress appar-
ently wanted to cover all the bases. 
35. In fact, the Supreme Court has already established that plaintiffs in § 1983 cases 
need not previously have exhausted available state judicial or administrative remedies. 
See, e.g., Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982) (finding no administrative 
exhaustion requirement); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961} (findin~ no judici~ 
exhaustion requirement). Again, Congress appears to have been overcautious on this 
point. 
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legitimacy of these "restraint doctrines." There is some dis-
agreement as to whether some of these doctrines are better un-
derstood as being grounded in congressional edicts or judge-
made common law, as well as disagreement as to whether some 
of these doctrines are good law or good policy.36 But for pur-
poses of exploring the Klein issue, such debates need not be en-
gaged today. For better or worse these restraint doctrines must 
be acknowledged to exist in current law, whatever the statutory 
or judicial source. And under the law as it preexisted the Schiavo 
Relief Act, one or more of these doctrines would have precluded 
federal court review of federal law challenges to the termination 
of Terri Schiavo's life support. 
IV 
Of course, nothing said so far would preclude Congress 
from eliminating or modifying any or all of these restraint doc-
trines through appropriately prospective and general legislation, 
so long as the specific modification lies within Congress' limited 
realm of legislative authority.37 But the question remains 
whether the Schiavo Relief Act qualifies as appropriately pro-
spective and general legislation. 
Now, the notions of generality and prospectivity must be 
unpacked in order to distinguish between two possible readings 
of the Klein prohibition, one focusing on the legislation's scope 
and the other on its form. 
A. KLEIN AS A CONSTRAINT ON LEGISLATIVE SCOPE 
Some have suggested that, according to the principle estab-
lished in Klein, Congress simply cannot dictate the resolution (in 
whole or in part) of a single dispute, whether it does so by chang-
ing the content of applicable law or by directing the judicial im-
36. See, e.g., Symposium, The Rooker -Feldman Doctrine, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 
1081 (1999) (discussing the source and the propriety of doctrine); Martin H. Redish, Ab-
stention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 
(1984) (challenging the propriety of judge-made abstention law). 
37. Congressional power to dictate procedures for entertaining and adjudicating 
federal statutory claims would seem both to be "necessary and proper" for the power to 
enact the substantive statutory claim in question, and also incident to the express and 
implied powers to regulate the jurisdiction of the Supreme and lower federal courts, re-
spectively. Congressional power to dictate procedures for entertaining and adjudicating 
federal constitutional claims would seem to fall into this latter category of jurisdiction-
regulating powers as well. I am assuming here that none of the restraint doctrines in 
question are constitutionally mandated, such that Congress could not alter them under 
any circumstances. 
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plementation of existing law.38 Put differently, congressional di-
rectives influencing federal court adjudication-of any form-
must at least apply to more than n=l cases. Such a rule would 
resonate with equal protection principles, with the point being 
that Congress will less likely impose unfairly or unreasonably 
onerous burdens on a party to an ongoing legal dispute if its leg-
islative prescriptions must necessarily apply (at least until re-
pealed or re-amended) to a class of disputes, all the more so if 
some within that class are as-yet unknown disputes. 
Others have suggested that any such principle of legislative 
generality or prospectivity might more appropriately be 
grounded in equal protection (or sometimes bill of attainder) 
doctrine than be viewed as a directive of Klein under separation 
of powers principles.39 There is certainly something to this sen-
timent. While it might violate these other doctrines, it is unclear 
why Congress would be arrogating to itself the "judicial power" 
if it changed the law even only for a specific case because the 
federal courts would be asked to do only that which they rou-
tinely do: apply the (concededly narrowly applicable) governing 
law to adjudicate the case at hand. And the one irrefutable 
statement about the Klein rule is that it was am1ounced in the 
Klein case, which involved legislation theoretically and practi-
cally applicable to multiple disputes. 
I leave for another day the questions whether the Constitu-
tion precludes n=l legislation and, if so, whether the source of 
that constraint is best understood as the Klein separation of 
powers principle or the equal protection clause or some other 
constitutional provision or doctrine.40 It shall suffice for now to 
make the following observation: If there is such a constraint and 
it stems from Klein, then the Schiavo Relief Act clearly violates 
it-and that is true whether one views the Act as amending cur-
rent law or as directing the district court's application of existing 
law, a question to which I am about to turn. Whatever else one 
can say, clearly this Act is designed to govern one and only one 
dispute.41 That, in fact, is one reason many critics decried Con-
38. Judge Birch uses language suggestive of this view. See Schiavo ex reL Schindler 
v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1274 n.4 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that the problem "is the ab-
rogation of such standards (of review] in a single case, not in a category of cases like ha-
beas corpus cases") (emphasis in original). 
39. See, e.g., Scheidegger, supra note 27, at 922; Girardeau A. Spann, Expository 
Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 585,594-95 (1983). 
40. This question was expressly identified but left unaddressed in Robertson v. Se-
attle Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 429,441 (1992). 
41. One might object that the Act seems to authorize more than one suit; standing 
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gress' intervention as political grandstanding, a transparent act 
of "symbolic legislation" designed to score easy political points 
rather than to address a serious and ongoing problem concerning 
confusion over end-of-life decisionmaking norms in our soci-
ety.42 
B. KLEIN AS A CONSTRAINT ON THE MEANS BY WHICH 
CONGRESS MAY INFLUENCE ADJUDICATION 
As explained previously, the narrower and more traditional 
understanding of the Klein principle is this: While Congress may 
add to or eliminate or amend the applicable law governing a sin-
gle dispute, Congress may not leave existing law unchanged and 
yet direct a federal court to interpret or apply that law to a dis-
pute in any particular manner. But herein lies the problem. Can 
it plausibly be said that Congress in fact amended or superseded 
the existing law with respect to these restraint doctrines? Can it 
be said that a district court entertaining a suit by Terri's parents 
has simply been directed to apply "new laws" governing preclu-
sion, abstention, and exhaustion-and under those new laws 
there are no such restraints applicable to the case? If Klein is to 
mean anything anymore, I think the answer has to be no. 
It is worth recalling again the precise language of the stat-
ute: 
[T]he District Court shall determine de novo any claim [under 
this Act], notwithstanding any prior State court determination 
and regardless of whether such a claim has previously been 
raised, considered, or decided in State court proceedings. The 
District Court shall entertain and determine the suit without 
any delay or abstention in favor of State court proceedings, 
and regardless of whether remedies available in the State 
is granted to "[a]ny parent of Theresa Marie Schiavo," Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 1, 119 Stat. 15 
(2005), and depending on whether "parent" is limited to biological relations, this grant of 
standing clearly encompasses at least two people, if not more under imaginable circum-
stances. But while Section II grants multiple individuals statutory standing, Section I 
makes clear that any suit or claim shall be brought "by or on behalf of Theresa Marie 
Schiavo," § 1, 119 Stat. 15. It seems to me that if Terri's parents brought two suits in se-
rial fashion, the second would be barred by principles of preclusion. So the Act itself is 
designed to govern n=1 disputes even though it authorizes multiple parties to litigate that 
dispute. 
42 Of course, if such was truly Congress' motive, the effort clearly backfired with 
respect to popular opinion. Moreover, it would not surprise me if the courts eventually 
hearing the case were less rather than more inclined to stay the termination of Terri's life 
support based on a subconscious recognition that their independence was being chal-
lenged. 
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courts have been exhausted.43 
There is no affirmative statement in these provisions that 
any law or legal standards have been changed, even narrowly or 
temporarily. Rather, the Act simply directs the District Court to 
apply these bodies of restraint law in a particular way, and that 
particular way is to ignore them as potential barriers to said suit. 
In fact, when I have taught Klein in the classroom, I have of-
fered hypotheticals pretty close to this in an effort to demon-
strate language that Congress might use if it were, for some per-
verse reason, trying to violate Klein. I suppose I could imagine 
worse: The Act could have said "if, in a suit brought by Terri's 
parents, the defendants raise as defenses to the suit the legal 
doctrines of preclusion, abstention, or exhaustion, the District 
Court shall resolve each of these legal doctrines in favor of the 
plaintiff parents." But the actual statutory language amounts es-
sentially to the same thing: The district court is told that, as it 
"determines" the resolution of any claim of Terri's on the merits, 
the court must simply close its eyes to these defenses and adjudi-
cate the case as if these restraint doctrines did not exist and 
hence were unavailable for the defendants to invoke.44 
Finally, heretofore unnoticed is a striking fact: The Act's 
mandate that the district court "determine" Terri's claims with-
out recourse to the listed restraint doctrines is directed specifi-
cally and solely to the "District Court" alone, and not more 
broadly to the federal courts. The most straightforward reading 
of the statutory language would thus mean that, on appeal, nei-
ther the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals nor the Supreme 
Court would be precluded from dismissing the parents' lawsuit 
on the basis of these restraint doctrines. Of course, perhaps one 
could infer from the language directed to the district court that 
Congress would have intended the appellate courts similarly to 
close their eyes to these putative defenses. But the mere fact that 
43. Schiavo Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 2, 119 Stat. 15 (2005). 
44. The doctrines being pretended away in the Schiavo Relief Act could help only 
one party, the defendant. But I don't mean to suggest that the result would be different 
were this not the case. Suppose the Act said "the District Court shall not consider any 
legal issues concerning the timeliness of the filing of motions under the Rules of Civil 
Procedure." That directive might assist either the plaintiffs or defendants (or at different 
times both) depending on context, but it would still be a legislative directive that the dis-
trict court "close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law." Marbury v. Madi-
son, 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch) 137,178 (1803). But on a spectrum surely the concerns under-
lying Klein should be at their zenith when Congress "disappears" one or more legal 
doctrines that, in the context of a particular case, could be invoked only by and to the 
advantage of one of the two parties. 
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the Act says the "District Court shall determine"45 Terri's 
claims, as opposed to that "the federal courts shall determine," 
seems highly revealing. One would obviously expect Congress to 
use the latter locution were it consciously intending to amend 
the applicable federal law. To my mind, Congress' oddly exclu-
sive reference to the "District Court" makes it even more rea-
sonable to describe the Act as imposing a "rule of decision" on 
the district court rather than as changing the law applic:1ble to 
this (let alone any other) case. 
In sum, if the Schiavo Relief Act does not violate the prin-
ciple established in Klein, then that case is essentially confined to 
its facts (and, indeed, probably wrongly decided on those facts). 
Now, I can imagine the following response to the foregoing 
conclusion: 
So what? OK, the Schiavo Relief Act's language indicates 
that Congress either lacked a good federal courts scholar on 
staff or rushed this bill through so quickly that it either failed 
to ask or failed to care about the considered views on the 
Klein issue. But Congress could have used different and bet-
ter language to get to the same place, by clearly amending or 
superseding the law governing these restraint doctrines appli-
cable directly to the specific lawsuit contemplated by Terri's 
parents. The Act might, for example, have addressed the re-
straint doctrines using languare similar to that used in the 
provision governing standing,4 or in Section 3 "Time for Fil-
ing": "Notwithstanding any other time limitation, any suit or 
claim under this Act shall be timely if filed within 30 days af-
ter the date of enactment of this Act. "47 Section 3 supersedes 
the running of any other statute of limitations, and it does so 
clearly by specifying a new limitations period applicable to all 
suits under this new federal statute. In parallel form, Section 2 
could have said something like the following: "Notwithstand-
ing any other provision of law, any suit or claim under this 
Act shall be governed by the following rules of procedure: 
neither claim nor issue preclusion shall attach to any prior 
state court proceeding or judgment; the existence of any on-
going or new claim filed in state court shall not affect the tim-
ing of federal court resolution of the claim; and the claim 
need not have been litigated in state court proceedings as a 
prerequisite to its filing in federal court under this Act." 
Given this alternative possibility, what's the harm in letting 
45. Section 2, 119 Stat. 15. 
46. See supra note 32. 
47. Section 4, 119 Stat. 15. 
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Congress get away with the loose language it actually used? 
Again, so what? 
Well, this is a fair question, boiling down to the question 
whether the Klein rule is in practice nothing more than a trivial 
rule of drafting etiquette. Perhaps the Court thinks so, as evi-
denced by its distinction of Klein in Robertson v. Seattle Audu-
bon Society.48 There, the Court struggled mightily, to my mind, 
to reach the conclusion that language that seemed to direct 
courts in specified cases to deem satisfied certain regulatory re-
quirements governing timber harvesting49 actually amended the 
substantive law. 5° The Court's apparent willingness to work very 
hard to avoid Klein might suggest its lack of regard for the prin-
ciple it supposedly espouses, an attitude reinforced by its refusal 
even to confirm the principle's continuing vitality.51 
In my view, however, even if Klein is reducible in operation 
to a rule of drafting etiquette, it remains a rule that can matter. 
It strikes me as important that federal courts always maintain 
their proper self-understanding of being neutral and final arbi-
ters of what the law is and how it applies to specific cases-even 
if and when the law applies only to single cases. Only this self-
understanding can generate sufficient norms of independence 
and, frankly, essentiality, to safeguard long-term fidelity to the 
rule of law. Widespread public understanding that courts play 
this independent role is necessary to building long-term public 
support for it in the face of periodic congressional temptation to 
cross the line. And linguistic formulations contained in statutes 
may make a difference to these understandings. For these rea-
sons, it is perfectly sensible for courts to continue enforcing the 
48. 503 u.s. 429,441 (1992). 
49. The pertinent statutory provision provided in part: "[T)he Congress hereby de-
termines and directs that management of areas according to subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) 
of this section on the thirteen national forests in Oregon and Washington and Bureau of 
Land Management lands in western Oregon known to contain northern spotted owls is 
adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory requirements that are 
the basis for [three pending cases identified by name). The guidelines adopted by subsec-
tions (b )(3) and (b )(5) of this section shall not be subject to judicial review by any court 
of the United States." I d. at 435 n.2. 
50. See id. at 438 (concluding the statute "compelled changes in law, not findings or 
results under old law"). 
51. Id. at 441 ("The Court of Appeals held that subsection (b)(6)(A) was unconsti-
tutional under Klein because it directed decisions in pending cases without amending any 
law. Because we conclude that subsection (b)(6)(A) did amend applicable law, we need 
not consider whether this reading of Klein is correct.") (emphasis in original); see also 
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) ("Whatever the precise scope of 
Klein, however, later decisions have made clear that its prohibition does not take hold 
when Congress 'amend[s) applicable law."'). 
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Klein principle, even if Congress can usually or perhaps always 
achieve its desired ends by actually changing the law. 52 
But as explained above, Congress simply did not do this in 
the Schiavo Relief Act. A fair reading of the Act suggests that 
Congress dictated judicial application of existing law, rather than 
changed the law to be applied. As such, the Act violates the 
separation of powers-unless, as I now explore, there are here-
tofore unarticulated limits to the principle. 
v 
A. KLEIN AND THE SUBSTANCE/PROCESS DISTINCTION 
If it is clear by now (as I think it is) that there is a Klein vio-
lation-or at the very least a serious Klein issue to be ad-
dressed-then why is Judge Birch virtually alone in assailing the 
Schiavo Relief Act on these grounds?53 I wonder if this reflects 
an intuitive distinction between substance and process: Congress 
may have tinkered with the application of some procedural doc-
trines, but Congress did not tell the federal courts how to rule on 
the substantive merits of the parents' claims and therefore, in a 
plausibly relevant sense, did not tell the courts how to "decide 
the case." Indeed, at first glance, one might characterize Con-
gress as trying to undecide the case (as it then stood after the 
state court proceedings had run their course) so as to ensure a 
fresh and neutral hearing of the claims in a federal court.54 Isn't 
this a far cry from congressional arrogation of the judicial power 
to resolve the competing federal law claims in the dispute? 
Well, yes and no. If one views the federal court adjudication 
in a vacuum, starting with commencement of the federal suit, 
52 Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(referring to federal commandeering of state officials as violating the "etiquette of feder-
alism"). 
53. There were a number of conversations on academic scholar-driven list serves 
concerning the constitutionality of the Schiavo Relief Act, but to the best of my recollec-
tion only Professor Doug Laycock and I contemporaneously articulated the Klein prob-
lem. Others seemed quickly dismissive of this concern and took more seriously other 
possible justifications for Judge Birch's conclusion, including a violation of Pwut, 514 
U.S. 211, through congressional reopening of a final state court judgment, and a violation 
of equal protection or bill of attainder principles for the n=1 reason discussed above. 
54. Judge Tjotlat obliquely hints at this distinction in his reply to Judge Birch. See 
Schiavo ex rei. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1281 n.S (11th Cir. 2005) (dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en bane) ("The rules Congress has established here go to the 
extent of our authority to assess the merits of claims, without authorizing any new claims 
or elements thereof to guide our determination of federal questions."). 
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then yes, it seems difficult to contend that Congress interfered 
with judicial independence to say what the law is. 
But, of course, the federal adjudication should not be 
viewed in a vacuum precisely because preexisting procedural 
doctrines make the prior state proceedings relevant data for the 
federal adjudication. Put differently, Congress turned what un-
der preexisting law was a clear loser for Terri's parents (inde-
pendent of the merits of their substantive claims) into a potential 
winner (depending on the merits of their claims). To be sure, 
perhaps a "paradigmatic" Klein violation (if there is such a 
thing) turns a dispute for which either party might win (depend-
ing on the merits of the claims) into a clear winner for a particu-
lar party. But both moves involve telling the court how to articu-
late "what the law is" -in the former case, how the laws of 
preclusion, abstention, and exhaustion apply to the claims, and 
in the latter case, how the laws defining substantive rights apply 
to the claims. And more importantly, to my mind (since federal 
courts adjudicate cases rather than merely articulate "what the 
law is"), both moves directly influence which party wins and 
loses without changing the content of the law being applied. It is 
not clear to me why it should matter whether the law whose ap-
plication is being congressionally directed is deemed procedural 
rather than substantive, so long as it potentially disposes of the 
claims one way or the other. 55 
55. It is true that, in United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, the Court upheld a 
statute authorizing relitigation of a case brought years ago against the Government and 
distinguished Klein with language suggestive of a procedure/substance distinction. 448 
U.S. 371, 405 (1980) ("The amendment at issue in the present case ... waived the defense 
of res judicata so that a legal claim could be resolved on the merits. Congress made no 
effort in either instance to control the Court of Oaims' ultimate decision of that claim."). 
But the holding in Sioux is better understood as turning on the particularized principle, 
well-established in prior cases, that Congress may waive affirmative defenses of the 
United States to legal claims, such as res judicata here. See id. at 397-402 (discussing such 
cases}; id. at 430 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The fact that Congress did not dictate to 
the Court of Claims that a particular result be reached does not in any way negate the 
fact it has sought to exercise judicial power. This Court and other appellate courts often 
reverse a trial court for error without indicating what the result should be when the claim 
is heard again."); see also Plaut, 514 U.S. at 230 ("(O]ur holding (in Sioux] was as narrow 
as the precedent on which we had relied .... " To wit, "Congress has the power to waive 
the res judicata effect of a prior judgment entered in the Government's favor on a claim 
against the United States."). In Schiavo, of course, the restraint doctrines are waived in 
favor of Terri's parents, not the Government as a litigant as in Sioux. 
Interestingly, I recently heard Senator Carl Levin (D. MI) describe a pre-enactment 
battle in Congress over whether the Schiavo Relief Act should include a provision direct-
ing the district court, immediately upon a suit under the Act being filed, to stay any ef-
forts to remove Teri's feeding tube pending resolution of the merits. Senator Levin and 
others objected to such a provision, and he ultimately brokered an agreement that left 
the issue unaddressed in the final version of the statute. His objection, he explained, re-
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B. KLEIN AND CONGRESS' SECTION 5 AUTHORITY TO 
ENFORCE THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
545 
Perhaps the fact that hardly anyone voiced an objection to 
the Schiavo Relief Act on Klein grounds reflects a heretofore 
unarticulated view that the Act is Section 5 legislation that is ex-
empt from Klein scrutiny under these unique circumstances.56 
Here would be the argument. 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment57 authorizes Con-
gress to "enforce" the substantive protections secured by that 
Amendment by deterring or remedying unconstitutional state 
behavior. One can imagine that Terri could claim a Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty interest in maintaining her life, or a liberty 
interest in enjoying food (perhaps as a form of medical care) 
when someone is willing to provide it to her. And one can imag-
ine Terri claiming that one or both of these liberty interests were 
wrongly denied to her, either as a matter of "substantive due 
process" (meaning they were denied to her without a sufficiently 
strong governmental interest in doing so },58 or as a matter of 
"procedural due process" (meaning they were denied to her 
without a sufficiently fair process for determining the propriety 
of that denial}. 59 One can also imagine that the denial of her sub-
stantive or procedural rights came at the hands of a state actor, 
either a state court or some other state actor involved somehow 
in the process of removing or ordering removed Terri's feeding 
tube. Whether any combination of these arguments constitutes a 
persuasive constitutional claim on the merits is beyond my focus 
in this essay; I will leave it to others contributing to this collec-
tion of essays to evaluate the merits of these or other potential 
constitutional claims. For now let's just assume that Terri has 
one or more such non-frivolous claims to raise. 
fleeted his view that Congress could not constitutionally tell a federal court whether or 
not to issue a stay. Rather, he said, separation of powers principles meant that the court 
must be left free to apply the preexisting law governing the issuance of stays based on the 
court's own independent judgment. Whether the district must or should or may stay the 
termination of life support pending adjudication of the merits is quintessentially a proce-
dural issue, albeit a potentially dispositive one (as the absence of a stay could preclude 
ultimate relief for Terri's parents). But I do not recall anyone dismissing Senator Levin's 
professed concern about the stay provision on the ground that procedural rules are 
somehow exempt from Klein's reach. 
56. I credit my colleague Rich Friedman for stating this position to me, prompting 
these reflections. 
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."). 
58. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
59. See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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May the Schiavo Relief Act be viewed as a valid Section 5 
enforcement measure to safeguard Terri's rights? Seems likely. 
First, take the claim that a state actor's authorization of the re-
moval of Terri's feeding tube, or a state actor's would-be in-
volvement in the execution of that removal, is about to violate 
Terri's Fourteenth Amendment rights-and the state court pro-
ceedings simply got the merits wrong. The Schiavo Relief Act 
essentially allows the claim to be relitigated de novo in the fed-
eral court and provides the rightholder with a new opportunity 
for a neutral tribunal to safeguard her rights. No concrete "re-
lief' is issued unless the federal court finds a constitutional viola-
tion, which is to say that the remedial scheme seems perfectly 
tailored to safeguarding Terri's rights. Just like 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
the scheme seems not even to implicate the "congruence and 
proportional" standard the Court now applies to remedial 
schemes that prohibit some conduct that is not unconstitutional 
and thus are "prophylactic" in nature.60 
The Section 5 justification seems a bit more complicated 
under the scenario where Terri claims that the state court ruling 
itself violated either her substantive or procedural constitutional 
rights. The Schiavo Relief Act "remedies" this prior unconstitu-
tional behavior by inviting Terri's parents to relitigate the case in 
federal court, in essence circumventing the unconstitutional state 
proceedings. The Act thus renders (at Terri's parents' election) 
the state court proceedings null and void, whether or not there 
will eventually be a determination by the federal court that the 
state proceedings actually violated Terri's rights. Indeed, it 
seems doubtful that the federal court would ever actually adjudi-
cate whether the state court violated procedural due process in 
determining Terri's putative wishes concerning the feeding tube: 
The federal court would simply employ whatever process it be-
lieves is due as it adjudicates the question of Terri's desires, 
without having to decide whether any different state court proc-
ess rose to the level of an independent constitutional violation. 
Under these circumstances, the Schiavo Relief Act would 
appear to operate in a prophylactic manner, in the sense that the 
60. See Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 
Powers, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1127,1157-58 (2001) ("It is important to note that language in 
Boerne's progeny suggests that the proportionality analysis applies, at least in full dress, 
only to 'prophylactic' Section 5 measures that are overinclusive in that they sweep into 
their prohibitory scope some constitutional state conduct. By contrast, if a Section 5 
measure regulates only conduct judicially defined to violate the Constitution and merely 
supplements the judicial remedies therefor, then Congress would appear not to have to 
justify the measure with the same demonstration of need."). 
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state court proceedings would be rendered void (when Terri's 
parents file suit) even absent any finding, let alone reality, that 
the state proceedings were unconstitutional. If so, the Act would 
be subject to the "congruence and proportionality" standard.61 
On the one hand, under this standard the Court typically insists 
that Congress have some evidentiary basis for presuming that 
the state action being regulated is actually unconstitutional,62 
and I don't believe the legislative record in this case (as opposed 
to numerous press releases and media statements) would pro-
vide much if any support for such a conclusion. On the other 
hand, the burden imposed by the Act would appear to be ex-
ceedingly slight-no state court is actually enjoined to do or not 
do anything at all, and any relief that ultimately flows to Terri 
would be awarded directly by the federal court, completely by-
passing the state system. While the issue is not free of doubt, 
let's assume for present purposes that, under these circum-
stances, the Act should be viewed as an appropriate Section 5 
enforcement measure to the extent it authorizes relitigation of 
federal constitutional claims against state actors. It is worth not-
ing that Section 5 could not authorize federal statutory claims 
brought pursuant to the Schiavo Relief Act (such as the claim 
Terri's parents brought against Terri's hospice under the Reli-
gious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act63), nor any 
claims brought against private actors (such as the claims they 
brought against the hospice and against Michael Schiavo ).64 
But let's return to the focus of this essay, for which the rele-
vant question is this: Does the assumption that the Schiavo Re-
lief Act falls within Congress' legislative jurisdiction as an en-
forcement measure under Section 5 somehow make the Klein-
based separation of powers argument disappear? I don't think a 
persuasive case can be made for this conclusion. 
61. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997) (stating that, for 
prophylactic Section 5 legislation to be valid, "(t)here must be a congruence and propor-
tionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that 
end."); Caminker, supra note 60, at 1153-58 (elaborating the meaning of this test). 
62 See, e.g., Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. 
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639 (1999) ("For Congress to invoke § 5, it must identify conduct 
transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions, and must tailor its 
legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct."). 
63. 42 u.s.c. § 2000cc (2000). 
64. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-27 (2000) (stating that Section 
5 legislation must be directed at state officials rather than private wrongdoers). But see 
Evan Caminker, Private Remedies for Public Wrongs Under Section 5, 33 LoYOLA L.A. 
L. REv. ~351 (2000) (a~guing that under certain circumstances a remedy against private 
actors IDight well constitute an appropriate means of deterring or remedying unconstitu-
tional state action). 
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First, tnere is no good reason to view Section 5's independ-
ent grant of legislative authority to Congress as somehow 
uniquely trumping all other constitutional restrictions on con-
gressional action. Rather, like other independent grants of 
power such as, say, the power to regulate interstate commerce, 
as a prima facie matter Section 5 power is subject to limitations 
imposed elsewhere in the Constitution, be they procedural (e.g., 
Section 5 legislation is valid only upon presentment to the Presi-
dent), 65 protective of individual rights (e.g., Section 5 legislation 
cannot authorize the imposition of cruel and unusual punish-
ments),66 or structural (e.g., Section 5 legislation cannot issue or 
annul pardons).67 The Court has endorsed this general principle 
with respect to Section 5 by making clear that Congress cannot 
invoke this power in order to "restrict, abrogate, or dilute" con-
stitutional guarantees.68 Moreover, one might plausibly argue 
this constraint is internal to the language of Section 5 itself. The 
Supreme Court has taken the position that legislation that vio-
lates structural constitutional principles cannot constitute 
"proper" legislation under the Necessary and Proper Clause.69 If 
65. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 7, cl. 2. 
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
67. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 1. 
68. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) ("We emphasize that 
Congress' power under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of 
the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guar-
antees. Thus, for example, an enactment authorizing the States to establish racially seg-
regated systems of education would not be-as required by§ 5-a measure 'to enforce' 
the Equal Protection Oause since that clause of its own force prohibits such state laws."). 
I believe Justice Brennan's explanation of his so-called "ratchet theory" in terms of 
whether a rights-violating application of Section 5 would qualify as "enforcement" raises 
some difficult questions. See Caminker, supra note 60, at 1176. Rather, I think the 
"ratchet theory" is alternatively and perhaps better understood in terms of cross-cutting 
constitutional restrictions. The reason a Section 5 statute mandating segregated school 
systems is impermissible is because it would constitute federal legislation violating the 
equal protection principle held to be implicitly embedded within the Fifth Amendment's 
Due Process Oause applicable to all federal legislation. 
This may be a good space in which to point out that the legitimacy of the Act as Sec-
tion 5 legislation and the procedure/substance distinction explored earlier are comple-
mentary. Suppose Congress had provided that, as a remedy to what it perceived as un-
constitutional state court decisionmaking, Terri's feeding tube simply shall not be 
removed. Such a federal edict might well violate her right to refuse medical treatment, as 
the state courts themselves found. By contrast, a purely procedural remedy ("disappear-
ing" procedural doctrines that would otherwise insulate the state court decision from 
federal review) that entitles Terri (at her parents' election) to a new judicial proceeding 
consistent with constitutional principles to determine her wishes cannot violate the 
ratchet theory-assuming we take as tautologically true that the federal court gets the 
constitutional arguments right. 
69. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923--24 (1997) ("When a 
'La[w] ... for carrying into Execution' the Commerce Oause violates the principle of 
state sovereignty reflected in the various constitutional provisions we mentioned earlier, 
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one accepts this argument/0 it seems a short step to conclude 
that the same would be true of "appropriate" legislation under 
Section 5. 
So we reach a more focused question: Is there any reason to 
believe that, while exercises of Section 5 power are not categori-
cally exempt from constitutional scrutiny, such exercises are ap-
propriately exempt from some specific constitutional constraints, 
including the Klein prohibition? Well, the Supreme Court has 
held that Congress may employ its Section 5 authority to over-
come certain federalism constraints that remain applicable to 
other grants of congressional power.71 But this is because the 
whole point of Section 5 was to enable Congress to enforce a 
new conception of federalism, and thus the supersession of oth-
erwise-applicable federalism constraints was considered inher-
ently bound up in the very grant of power. Put differently, there 
might be certain contexts in which it makes sense to read a spe-
cific grant of congressional power as implicitly authorizing Con-
gress to override structural constraints that would otherwise 
throttle the essential function of the grant of power. 72 
it is not a 'La[w] ... proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce aause ... .'") 
(citations omitted) (citing Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of 
Federal Power: A Jurisdiaional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 
(1993) (arguing that a law is not "proper" if it violates separation of powers principles, 
federalism principles, or individual rights)). 
70. I personally do not. See Caminker, supra note 60, at 1138-39 n.47 (explaining 
why this interpretation of "proper" is unpersuasive ). 
71. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that 
Congress may not do the same pursuant to the commerce clause); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 
427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that Congress may override state sovereign immunity 
and authorize private damages suits against states pursuant to Section 5). See generally 
City of Rome v. United States, 446 US 156, 179 (1980) ("[P]rinciples of federalism that 
might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are necessarily overridden by 
the power to enforce the Civil War Amendments 'by appropriate legislation."'). 
72. For my previous consideration of another such example, see Evan H. Caminker, 
Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 SUP. Cr. REV. 199, 238-42. In 
Printz v. United States, the Court held that congressional commandeering of state offi-
cials to implement federal law impermissibly infringed on the President's Article II pre-
rogatives to oversee all federal law execution. 521 U.S. 898,922-23 (1997). But the Court 
approved Congress's long-standing conscription of state executives to extradite fugitives 
from justice as a "direct implementation ... of the Extradition Clause of the Constitution 
itself, see Art. IV, § 2.'' ld at 909. The Militia Clauses appear to authorize Congress to 
conscript the states' primary military institutions for certain national purposes-including 
to "execute the Laws of the Union," U.S. CONST. art I,§ 8, cis. 15 & 16; and the Article I, 
Section 4 power to regulate state elections of federal officials seems to entail comman-
deering. These specific grants of power to Congress to commandeer state officials would 
essentially be rendered a nullity if they were subject to the same Article II constraint on 
commandeering the Court invoked to invalidate commerce clause-based legislation in 
Printz. It thus seems reasonable to read these specific grants as implicitly overriding the 
Article II constraint. 
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It might be tempting to conclude that the Schiavo Relief 
Act should be immune from Klein scrutiny following this line of 
reasoning. By hypothesis, Congress had sufficient reason to be-
lieve that Terri's federal constitutional rights were either vio-
lated by or at least left unprotected by the Florida state courts. 
Invoking Section 5 to protect Terri's rights by affording her an 
adjudicatory "do-over," by giving her representatives access to 
federal district court and by freeing the federal court from the 
otherwise disabling effects of the prior state court proceedings, 
seems like a surgical-strike solution to the problem. Indeed, it is 
difficult to imagine an alternative remedial scheme that is any 
less intrusive on or disrespectful of state authority. One might 
even characterize the Schiavo Relief Act as the most desirable 
enforcement measure possible-on federalism grounds. 
But I fail to see why this conclusion that the Act is particu-
larly federalism-friendly should free Congress from its obligation 
to respect separation of powers principles as well-especially be-
cause the two principles are not irreconcilable or even in concep-
tual conflict, contrary to the examples provided above. If I am 
correct in assuming that Congress could have paved the way for 
federal adjudication by prospectively amending the existing re-
straint doctrines rather than dictating a rule of decision as to 
their application to Terri's case/3 then Congress could have sur-
gically excised the restraint doctrines from the case without run-
ning afoul of Klein. And, at the risk of being accused of nitpick-
ing here, it seems worth noting that, as a textual matter, Section 
5 itself authorizes Congress to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's provisions by "appropriate legislation," undermining any 
suggestion that Section 5 implicitly authorizes Congress to pass 
"the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial 
power."74 The fact that directing the District Court to ignore in-
convenient legal doctrines that might preclude it from reaching 
the merits is an efficient and federalism-respecting response to a 
perceived state constitutional violation shouldn't permit Con-
gress to usurp judicial power, any more than the fact that Terri 
might have been about to die would have justified a congres-
73. See supra at Part IV B. Note that, if the assumption is false because Congress 
cannot resolve n=1 disputes either by changing the law or imposing a rule of decision, see 
supra at Part IV A., then the Section 5 defense of the Act would fail in any case-unless 
one can persuasively explain why Section 5 should be understood as implicitly overriding 
the generality principle undergirding the n=1 prohibition. 
74. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128,147 (1871). 
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sional decision to bypass presentment to the President while or-
dering Terri's feeding tube to be maintained. 
It thus seems to me clear that, while Congress can invoke 
Section 5 to provide remedies for victims of unconstitutional 
state behavior, Congress must still do so by acting as a legisla-
ture. Congress can protect federal constitutional rights by enact-
ing new law or changing existing law, but not by simply directing 
federal courts to ignore existing and unchanged bodies of proce-
dural law in the course of adjudicating constitutional claims. 
VI 
The fact that Judge Birch stands virtually alone in decrying 
the Schiavo Relief Act on the ground that it impermissibly dic-
tates a rule of decision for federal adjudication seems telling. As 
I outlined in Part IV, if the traditional view of Klein remains 
good law, then there is a very strong prima facie case that the 
Schiavo Relief Act contravenes it. And as I explained in Part V, 
I don't think the challenge to the Act can be dismissed either on 
the ground that Congress ordered federal courts to apply a pro-
cedural rather than a substantive rule of decision or on the 
ground that Section 5 uniquely empowers Congress to dictate a 
rule of decision in this context. If the Schiavo Relief Act does 
not contravene separation of powers principles, then Klein has 
essentially become immune from violation-and perhaps it's 
time that we all say so. 
